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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
cause the information of hearing dates and evidence relied
upon would be within the knowledge of the Board. The only
additional administrative burden would consist of making the
information available to the inmate.
V. CONCLUSION
In assessing the nature of an inmate's interest in being re-
leased on discretionary parole when eligible, the Court in
Greenholtz blurred its traditional two-step procedural due
process analysis by examining the nature of the state's deter-
mination procedures affecting that interest. This approach not
only leaves unclear what analysis courts are to apply in future
procedural due process determinations but, as applied in
Greenholtz, also reveals an improper interpretation of the
proceeding employed in recent procedural due process cases.
In finding that there was no protected interest in parole
releases, the Court ignored the importance of parole to society
in many respects, including sentencing and rehabilitation. It
similarly treated lightly the practical effects of the right to pa-
role created by the mere existence of a state parole system.
This was emphasized by the Court's analysis of the interest
created by statutory language, which interest was not satisfac-
torily distinguished from that created under the existence of a
parole system itself. Finally, even where the Court found an
interest entitled to some measure of constitutional protection,
the minimum requirements approved are insufficient to over-
come the risk of error and prejudice to the inmates.
BARBARA S. SMITH
TORTS - Products Liability - Strict Liability and
Warranty in Products Liability Action. Austin v.
Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233
(1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court first adopted a strict
tort liability theory in products liability cases,1 it was pre-
1. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (holding that fulfilling
the elements of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) constituted "negli-
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dicted that "this case may well become the forerunner for the
eventual removal of all products liability cases from the provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code."'2 Eleven years later,
the court apparently has fulfilled this prophecy while purport-
ing to send the warranty theory of products liability, in Pros-
ser's words, "on its way to the ashcan." In Austin v. Ford
Motor Co.,4 the court held that a party cannot maintain a
claim for breach of warranty8 if the party can plead the strict
liability in tort theory.'
Prosser long had advocated that courts "jettison' 7 war-
ranty theory and "discard" the word warranty8 because strict
liability was the proper ground for relief in products liability
cases.9 Reliance on Prosser's theoretical predilection led the
Wisconsin court in Austin to reject plaintiff's warranty
claims1 in favor of strict liability. In rejecting warranty the-
ory, the Wisconsin court seems to have treated warranty as a
creature of the common law, a court-created transitional
fiction "born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract.""
Two objections to this aspect of Austin arise: (1) the case
fails to confront the twentieth century legislative basis for
warranty and operates as an inappropriate judicial nullifica-
tion of a statutory remedy; and (2) because strict liability does
not entirely overlap warranty, Austin will completely prevent
recovery in certain situations where plaintiff would otherwise
succeed under, and only under, Chapter 402 of the Wisconsin
Statutes.1 2
gence per se"). See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
2. Note, 51 MARQ. L. Rzv. 208, 212 (1968).
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 98, at 658 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as W. PROSSER, TORTS].
4. 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
5. See text accompanying notes 63-68 infra, concerning whether the intended
holding or practical effect reaches only implied warranty or express warranty as well.
6. 86 Wis. 2d at 644, 273 N.W.2d at 239-40.
7. W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 3, § 98 at 656.
8. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MM.
L. REv. 791, 802 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Fall], quoted in Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d at 456, 155 N.W.2d at 61, and relied upon in Austin v. Ford Motor
Co., 86 Wis. 2d at 645-46, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
9. Id.
10. 86 Wis. 2d at 646, 273 N.W.2d at 241.
11. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 8, at 800.
12. See Wis. STAT. §§ 121.15, .69 (1961) (Wisconsin's version of § 15 and § 69 of
the Uniform Sales Act) repealed and recreated as Wis. STAT. §§ 402.314, .315 (1965)
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II. Austin AND WARRANTY LAW IN CONTEXT
A. Wisconsin Products Liability History
Prior to 1967, Wisconsin permitted two theories of liability
for cases involving defective products: negligence and war-
ranty. Under the old Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code adopted in 1965, breach of express or im-
plied warranties could lead to recovery for personal injury,
property damage and economic loss.' 3 Similarly, the scope of
(Wisconsin's version of § 2-314 and § 2-315 of the U.C.C.). Most important to prod-
ucts liability, since it is the more frequently applicable of the two implied warranties
under the Code, is the implied warranty of merchantability under Wis. STAT. §
402.314:
Implied warranty- merchantability; usage of trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (s. 402.316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such ds:
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (s. 402.316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Wis. STAT. § 402.314 (1977).
Section 402.315 provides for implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Wis. STAT. § 402.315 (1977).
o Property damage and personal injury are, under the Uniform Commercial Code,
matters of "consequential damages" under Wis. STAT. §§ 402.714 and 402.715. De-
tailed differences between the measure of damages among tort, U.C.C. and contract
claims are outside the scope of this article. This article focuses on the availability of
liability theories and treats matters of recovering for personal injury, damage to prop-
erty other than the product itself, and defective condition of the product itself or
other economic loss only insofar as they constitute very general types of harm which
satisfy or fail to satisfy the requisite elements for application of a given liability
theory.
13. See Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961) (defective con-
struction required repairs); A. E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d
479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974) (negligent design resulted in unusable floor; loss of profits
recovered). While these are not products cases, they demonstrate negligence will ap-
ply for pure economic loss, an important factor in determining the scope of tort re-
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negligence liability was developed by case law. Wisconsin fol-
lowed McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 4 in rejecting the old
common law "lack of privity" defense for negligence cases15
involving products "imminently dangerous" when defective.1 6
The last remnant of privity in negligence was expressly abol-
ished in the 1959 case of Smith v. Atco.17
However, in warranty cases the court had retained the
privity requirement that existed under common law and the
Uniform Sales Act,"8 even for cases involving food and prod-
ucts for intimate bodily use.19 Then, in 1962, the court noted
both the apparent harshness of the privity rule and the trend
among other courts to discard the privity requirement.20
With the 1965 adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the Wisconsin Legislature expressly provided that the class of
beneficiaries of warranties under the Code extended beyond
the immediate buyer to include:
any natural person who is in the family or household of his
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty.2 1
The official comment to this section indicated that this provi-
sion was a minimum standard and gave no further opinion on
the privity question. Rather, the comment stated that the
covery and of product liability.
14. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
15. Under the infamous English case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (1842).
16. Flies v. Fox Bros. Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928). Flies extended the
exception to the privity defense from products "inherently and normally dangerous"
to those imminently dangerous because of negligent construction. Id. at 207, 218
N.W. at 859.
17. 6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).
18. Id. at 383 n.2, 94 N.W.2d at 704 n.2 (dictum); see also Strahlendorf v. Wal-
green Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 435, 114 N.W.2d 823, 831 (1962) (dictum).
19. Bethia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960); Prinsen v.
Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927). Both cases rejected an opportunity to
establish the special food warranty which other jurisdictions extended to non privity
plaintiffs.
20. Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W.2d 823 (1962). See also
Kennedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner, 5 Wis. 2d 100, 92 N.W.2d 247 (1958) (remote
buyer allowed to circumvent privity by intervention in suit by dealer against
manufacturer).
21. WIs. STAT. § 402.318 (1977).
1980]
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courts could freely expand the class of beneficiaries reached
by warranties.2
In Dippel v. Sciano,28 an injured plaintiff alleged, inter
alia, that the manufacturer and distributor of a product had
breached express and implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for intended purpose. The trial court sustained the
demurrer of the two defendants on grounds of lack of privity.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the privity requirement
should be dropped from warranty.24 The court declined to de-
cide the question, choosing instead to reformulate the issue in
terms of the new strict liability in tort doctrine.
The court adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts25 as a rule of law establishing a tort law duty of
vendors to sell products free of defects creating an unreasona-
ble danger of physical injury2 to a consumer or user. Viola-
tion of this standard would make a seller negligent per se
under the rule of Osborne v. Montgomery.2 Any seller in the
22. This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the
family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section... is
neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on
whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other
persons in the distributive chain.
U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3 (1972) (emphasis added). The later version of the Code
offers two alternatives to the original provision, both of which expand the class of
beneficiaries further. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1979).
23. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
24. Brief for Appellant at 7-29; 37 Wis. 2d at 449, 155 N.W.2d at 57.
25. § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as § 402A].
26. Physical injury includes damage to other property of the consumer/user. See §
402A, supra note 25, at Comment d.
27. 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931). Wisconsin's negligence per se approach
received strong approval from Professor Wade in Wade, Is Section 402A of the Sec-
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distributive chain, including a remote manufacturer, could be
subject to this form of liability.28 Hence, the court created a
new, more expansive theory to join negligence as a basis for
liability without privity of contract.
The absence of a privity requirement and other features of
strict tort liability suggested that strict liability would be an
attractive alternative to or replacement for the warranty cause
of action. Interpreting provisions of the Uniform Sales Act'
as imposing warranty liability only on immediate sellers, the
Dippel court ignored the invitation in the comments to U.C.C.
section 2-31830 and simply concluded that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code did not substantially alter the privity require-
ment. The court further reasoned that even if the Code did
not require privity of contract, it still presented notice and
disclaimer difficulties.81
and Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?,
42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wade]. He reasoned that § 402A
differs from the type of strict liability of the Rylands v. Fletcher (L.R. 3 H.L. 330
(1868)) variety and that negligence per se makes clear that the cause of action is one
in tort, unquestionably outside the preemptive potential of the U.C.C. Id. at 142.
Dean Twerski disagreed, and criticized the approach as "sophistry." He was of the
view that lacking the doctrine of excused violation, it could not be negligence per se
but instead was strict liability. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault
- Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 321 (1977).
Maryland has embraced the theory of negligence per se for its strict liability doc-
trine. LaHocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490 (1979).
28. Section 402A, supra note 25, at (2).
29. See, e.g., notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
30. See note 22 supra.
31. The principal case, Austin v. Ford, relied on this rationale also. 86 Wis. 2d at
644-45, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
Yet, several commentators argue that these factors, and particularly notice of
breach and privity, have little actual restrictive effect because of the liberal treatment
both intended by the U.C.C. draftsmen and given by the courts when the claimant is
a consumer. See, e.g., Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jursiprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes
and Communication Barriers, 17 W. REs. L. Rsv. 5, 27-29 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Shanker]; Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in De-
fective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 1000 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Frank-
lin]; Sedgwick, Conley & Sleight, Products Liability: Implied Warranties, 48 MARQ.
L. REv. 139, 159-60 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sedgwick]. See note 39 infra.
Of course the Code explicitly provides protection for consumers against contrac-
tual limitations on warranty recovery, through U.C.C. § 2-719(2), with respect to rem-
edies for consequential damages, which section has been interpreted also to bar un-
conscionable exclusion of warranties, and through U.C.C. § 2-302, providing courts
with great flexibility in defeating clauses or contracts found unconscionable as a mat-
ter of law and offering logical authority for prohibiting disclaimers and exclusions of
1980]
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Another key factor in the Dippel rationale was the ease
with which the negligence per se formula fit into Wisconsin's
existing comparative negligence framework. The court held
that the contributory negligence of an injured party was a
proper consideration in products cases, while many courts tra-
ditionally had held that warranty did not allow for contribu-
warranties in consumer goods. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 12-11 and 12-12 (2d ed. 1980); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
The ability to disclaim implied warranties has been significantly restricted by the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act § 101, 15
U.S.C. § 2301 (1975). 15 U.S.C. § 2308 bars a supplier of consumer products from
disclaiming or modifying any implied warranties to a consumer if the supplier has
made any written warranties in the transaction or if it enters into a service contract
with the consumer within 90 days of the sale. Any disclaimer, modification or limita-
tion made in violation of the Act is rendered ineffective by the Act for purposes of
state as well as federal law.
In the past, there was concern that language in the Act "disclaiming" any effect
by the Act of liability for personal injury, would negate the effect of § 2308. However,
the provision concerned indicates otherwise:
Nothing in this title (other than sections 2304(a)(2) & (4) and 2308 of this
title) shall (A) affect the liability of, or impose liability on, any person for per-
sonal injury or (B) supersede any provision of State law regarding consequent-
ial damages for injury to the person or other injury.
15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1) (1975) (emphasis added).
Moreover, it is not perfectly clear that strict liability in tort is completely free of
effective disclaimer, whether that term of art is used or not. There may be much more
convergence between the two liability theories with respect to the actual scope of
permissible disclaimers than some are willing to discuss.
See Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir.
1974) (applying Pennsylvania law) (strict liability can be disclaimed between parties
of equal bargaining power); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709
(10th Cir. 1974) (applying Oklahoma law); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft
Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965); Velex v. Craine & Clark Lumber
Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973); McNichols, Who
Says That Strict Tort Disclaimers Can Never Be Effective? The Courts Cannot
Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 494 (1975).
Even restricting one's consideration to the text and comments of RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, it is ludicrous to state flatly, as does Comment m to §
402A, that strict liability can never be disclaimed or be altered by agreement. A sale
and attendant circumstances may be structured in many cases to invoke the doctrine
of contributory negligence of the assumption-of-risk type, see § 402A, supra note 25,
Comment n, or an effective warning may be given negating the element of unreasona-
ble danger, see § 402A, supra note 25, Comment j. The extremely close inter-relation-
ship of warnings, assumption of risk and disclaimers was not considered in the com-
ments to § 402A.
A bare disclaimer of strict tort liability solely under the formal terms of a contract
will not likely succeed in consumer transactions, although in commercial transactions,
the results easily could be the opposite as the material above indicates.
[Vol. 63:678
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tory negligence.32
The court in Dippel not only adopted a new theory of re-
covery, it also demonstrated its preference that products cases
be brought on a strict tort theory as a replacement for war-
ranty and not as a supplement. The Dippel court stated that
"we have determined that physically injured users or consum-
ers . ..should pursue their remedy under the rule of strict
liability in tort,"33 and this idea became the point of depar-
ture for the court in Austin.
B. The Austin Case
Although questioned, breach of warranty under Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code survived until 1979,
when the court decided Austin v. Ford Motor Co." The un-
derlying facts of this extended litigation occurred prior to the
decision in Dippel. Decedent Austin purchased a new 1966
Ford, equipped with seat belts, from a Ford dealer. Evidence
tended to indicate that the driver's seat belt was defective,
with hidden cuts in the fabric. Four months after the
purchase and with only 3,000 miles on the car, the seat belt
apparently broke during a roll-over accident, causing Austin
to be thrown from the car. She died from her injuries.
Schnabl, the original plaintiff, commenced an action three
years later 5 as guardian for decedent's children s and as per-
sonal representative of the estate. Ford Motor Company, the
manufacturer, and Jack White Ford, the dealer, were named
as defendants. The complaint alleged negligence, breaches of
32. See, e.g., Note, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 388, 394 (1967-68). But the assumption has
been rejected by some courts and commentators relying on Code language itself and
on policy.
Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129
(9th Cir. 1977) (applying Washington law); Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., 246
N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1978); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572
S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978); 2 FRUMER & FREDMAN, PRODucs LuBnmrrY, § 16.01(3)
(1979); Franklin, supra note 31, at 1004 n.179. Miller, The Cross Roads: The Case for
the Code in Products Liability, 21 OKLA. L. REv. 411, 427 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Miller].
33. 37 Wis. 2d at 463, 155 N.W.2d at 65.
34. 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
35. Just four days before the third anniversary of the incident or three days prior
to extinguishment of the claim under Wis. STAT. § 893.205(2) (1977).
36. Both children had been passengers in the auto at the time of the accident, but
they survived.
1980]
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express and implied warranties and strict liability for the al-
legedly defective seat belt.3 7
On remand for trial after reversal of defendants' summary
judgment,3 8 the trial court dismissed the warranty claims on a
finding of inadequate notice as a matter of law. 9 After the
37. Defendants moved for summary judgment, providing affidavits attempting to
establish that the facts took this case outside Wisconsin's wrongful death act, Wis.
STAT. § 895.03 (1977), which requires the death be "caused in this state." Id. Accord-
ing to the affidavits, the belts were manufactured and installed in Minnesota, and
that if any negligence had occurred, it occurred in Minnesota. Defendants also
averred that since the accident itself occurred in Indiana, the Indiana wrongful death
statute should apply and this required, inter alia, that the action be commenced
within two years of the date of death. Holding that Indiana law applied and that the
action was therefore barred as untimely, the trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment.
38. Plaintiff appealed, producing the first of three supreme court opinions con-
nected with this litigation. Reversing in Schnabl v. Ford, 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195 N.W.2d
602 (1972), the supreme court agreed with plaintiff that Wisconsin's wrongful death
statute would apply, along with the applicable three year statute of limitations, Wis.
STAT. § 893.205(2) (1977). The court held that a breach of warranty constituted a
"wrongful act, neglect or default" under the Wisconsin act. Id. In the instant case,
held the court, the breach of warranty and therefore the wrongful act could have
occurred in Wisconsin because delivery of the auto was effected in the state. While
the defect did not cause the accident, the court reasoned that it could have been a
cause of the death itself. Hence, if the defect existed at time of sale or delivery, the
death could have been caused at least partially in Wisconsin.
39. The trial court evaluated a letter to Ford from plaintiff's counsel a month
after the accident advising Ford that counsel had been retained to represent the chil-
dren whose mother was killed when her safety belt broke causing her to be thrown
from the car and resulting in her death. The letter included a copy of a newspaper
clipping describing the accident and indicating a faulty seat belt had broken. Counsel
asked Ford to have a representative contact them. The trial court held as a matter of
law that this was insufficient as notice because it did not state the buyer's claim that
the facts constitute a breach of warranty or that plaintiff will look to defendant for
damages. Appellant's Brief and Appendix, 17-18, 126-27.
It would appear that the trial court erred in so holding. First, Official Comments
of the Uniform Commercial Code indicate that the purpose of the notice requirement
is to "defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his rem-
edy." U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4, 5. Second, remote persons or nonbuyers are not
under the explicit notice requirement, but are obligated only to use good faith in
notifying upon awareness of their legal situation. See Shanker, supra note 31, at 27-
29. Third, the question of adequacy is generally for the jury, "and the defendant
would probably have to show prejudice for notice to be defective as a matter of law."
Sedgwick, supra note 31, at 160.
It is questionable that Ford was prejudiced by the content of this letter. A defen-
dant of such enormous resources, financial and legal, must have understood from the
letter that the parties were pursuing a claim arising from Ford's defective seat belt.
The issue of adequacy of notice, which opened the door for the demise of warranty,
need not have been present at all.
[Vol. 63:678
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verdict, the trial court ordered a new trial and plaintiff's chil-
dren appealed.4 e
40. The case went to the jury on strict liability. The jury verdict allocated 35% of
the causal "negligence" to Ford and 65% to the decedent. On motions after verdict,
the trial court struck the allocation of negligence to decedent on grounds that there
was no credible evidence to support the verdict finding that her negligence causally
contributed to her death. Asserting that the issue of contributory negligence had not
been adequately tried, the trial court ordered a new trial in the interest of justice. See
Wis. STAT. § 805.15(1) (1977).
On appeal, plaintiffs sought judgment on the verdict as "impliedly modified" by
the trial court's ruling that the causal connection between decedent's negligent driv-
ing and her death had not been established. The supreme court agreed with this re-
quest and modified the order below by directing the trial court to enter judgment on
the verdict minus the contributory negligence finding; i.e., Ford was held liable for
100% of the damages. Defendant had no right to a second attempt at carrying its
burden on the contributory negligence defense, reasoned the court. The primary issue
on this appeal was whether decedent's contributorily negligent driving could be a
substantial factor in her death. Defendants had proven her negligent driving had
caused the accident, but introduced no expert witness to state that her negligence was
a substantial factor in her death as opposed to the accident itself. The trial court held
there was no credible evidence to support the jury verdict finding that decedent's
negligence was a cause of her death. "[I]s it permissible inference or conclusion that
decedent's negligent driving was a cause of her death as well as to the extent it was a
contributing factor? The court is persuaded to the conclusion that it is not." 86 Wis.
2d at 637, 273 N.W.2d at 233. Juxtaposition of the trial court's recognition that the
negligent driving was "a contributing factor" against his refusal to infer that it was a
cause begs the question whether judicial analysis has now become completely alien-
ated from analysis by other persons. But the supreme court agreed:
The legal conclusion that the jury could not be permitted to infer the cause of
death from the speed and management of the vehicle alone is correct, although
such evidence could be used to prove the cause of the accident.
[Tihe transcript [which was not provided] might reveal facts sufficient to sup-
port the jury's finding that Barbara Austin's contributory negligence was a
cause of her death as well as of the accident.
86 Wis. 2d at 642, 293 N.W.2d at 239.
Summing up the court's positions, the facts and argument are as follows: Dece-
dent's negligent driving resulted in a rollover accident at high speed, during which
she was thrown about inside and thrown out of the vehicle after the defective seat
belt she was wearing broke, resulting in her death. But, without more than these
facts, her negligent driving cannot be considered as significant in causing the death.
To reduce this to simplest form, one must first recognize that her negligent driving
was a substantial, if not the sole factor in causing the accident. Thus to break the
causal connection between her driving and the death, there is only one point in the
linkage remaining - the accident itself. The positions of both courts can only mean
that they refused to recognize that the accident was significant in causing her death.
While these holdings distinguish themselves ipso facto from common sense, this
would not necessarily be true in a case with several causal forces in varying degrees of
remoteness, because one or more remote causes may be too attenuated to recognize it
even under the liberal Wisconsin "substantial factor" test (which, incidentally, does
not require a cause to be exclusive or even primary in order to be legally recognized).
See the earliest opinion in this same litigation, Schnabl v. Ford, 54 Wis. 2d 345, 353-
1980]
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Plaintiffs sought, inter alia, review of the trial court's dis-
missal of the warranty claims for lack of notice. Noting its
probable lack of jurisdiction to reach the notice question in
this appeal, the court held that it was not necessary to do so
in view of its actual disposition.41 Nonetheless, the court did
find it "appropriate" to seize the moment and announce that
"it is inappropriate to bring an action for breach of warranty
where a tort remedy is sought. '42 The preference for strict lia-
bility expressed in Dippel was not explicitly amplified to re-
quire dismissal of warranty allegations in products cases, or at
least in those cases that are, as Austin was, grounded "in
tort., 43
54, 195 N.W.2d 602, 607 (1972).
But here the incident was relatively simple and no such attenuation occurs. Dece-
dent's negligent driving caused an accident which was joined by one other cause, a
breaking seat belt, which other cause itself was set in motion from its passively defec-
tive state by her negligent driving, to produce fatal injuries. The legal nicety of dis-
tinguishing cause of death from cause of accident leading to death may be correct,
but it does not support the artificial, arbitrary severing of cause in a classical,
straightforward case of dual causation or causation by chain-of-events-set-in-motion
by a negligent actor. The court failed to recognize any problem in seemingly requiring
of defendants proof that the death would have occurred without the break in the belt.
This unrealistic and restrictive single-cause concept is inconsistent with prior Wis-
consin practice. For instance, the inference of cause of injury or death from cause of
accident which the court eschewed in Austin is routinely accomplished in other com-
parative negligence cases, particularly where active-passive negligence questions are
involved. See WISCONSIN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1500, 1580 and Comment to 1500,
paragraph 4.
The next appeal was Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Wis. 2d 96, 242 N.W.2d 251
(1976), involving post verdict motions and rights of appeal, and holding that plaintiff
had the right to appeal from an order for a new trial even though plaintiff had moved
for a new trial in the alternative to judgment n.o.v. or judgment on the verdict "as
approved" by the trial court's partial rejection of the verdict on causal contributory
negligence. Finally, the principal case, Austin, resolved the litigation 13 years after
the incident.
41. The instant appeal was from an order. "[D]efendant also asserts correctly that
...where the appeal is taken from an order, prior intermediate orders are not before
the court. On appeals from orders, this court lacks jurisdiction to review a prior inter-
mediate order. United States v. Burczyk, 54 Wis. 2d 67, 194 N.W.2d 608 (1972)." 86
Wis. 2d at 644, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
The strict liability claim provided a recovery of 100% of damages making the
warranty claim "irrelevant and extraneous." Id. at 644, 273 N.W.2d at 239.
42. 86 Wis. 2d at 644, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
43. Whether the qualifier "in tort" is a meaningful definition or limitation may be
questionable. See text accompanying notes 63-110 infra. Practically speaking, Austin
will reach any case brought over a substantial defect in a product.
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C. Other Jurisdictions
There is a split of authority among the states as to
whether a plaintiff may properly maintain an action grounded
in breach of warranty, where the remedy sought is compensa-
tion for personal injuries caused by a defective product which
is unreasonably dangerous. Even those courts that advocate
this restriction of warranty theory acknowledge that such a
restriction might conflict with the express provisions of theU.C.C.44
Six months prior to Austin, for instance, the New York
Court of Appeals hinted that it was willing to impinge on the
U.C.C. by restricting or eliminating the availability of its war-
ranty provisions. 45 Only three years earlier, the.Appellate Di-
vision had stated:
[T]he fact that New York now recognizes a strict-products-
liability cause of action does not mean that breach of war-
ranty under the Uniform Commercial Code no longer exists.
The breach-of-warranty causes of action under the code are
primarily related to the sales contract... and are separate
from a strict-products-liability cause of action, which is wed-
ded to the concept of a tortious wrong.46
44. The express warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are con-
tained in the following language from U.C.C. § 2-313:
§ 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description,
Sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform
to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall con-
form to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commen-
dation of the goods does not create a warranty.
45. Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1974),
afl'd sub. nom. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d
275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
46. 44 A.D.2d at 321, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 659. Compare Cerrato v. R. H. Crown Co.,
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The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division and expressly stated that four theories - express
warranty, implied warranty, negligence, and strict liability -
were available to plaintiffs and could be pleaded alone or in
combination.47 This reflects the majority rule and the pre-
Austin Wisconsin rule.48
Then, in Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment Co.,49 New
York suggested that it might not continue to recognize a sepa-
rate warranty cause of action based on the U.C.C. Martin in-
volved a local sale but an out-of-state injury. The court held
that negligence and strict liability claims accrue in the state of
injury and that breach of warranty claims which would accrue
in the state of sale required privity. Because the parties were
not in privity, the plaintiff was out of court. This strict inter-
pretation of privity occurred despite the fact that after the
approval of the concurrent availability of warranty and strict
tort liability,50 the New York Legislature had liberalized the
Code's warranty coverage to include any natural person who
could reasonably be expected to be affected by the product.51
The dissent in Martin argued that the legislative policy
was now so clearly expressed that the court should have ap-
plied the new amendment by analogy and brought the case
within the Code:
As a third party beneficiary, anyone who falls within the
protected class may, of course, bring a direct action for
breach of warranty against the seller .... Such a cause of
action is independent of the strict products liability cause of
action which we recognized in Codling and characterized as
tortious in Victorson; it is instead a contractual remedy cre-
ated solely by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the terms of the contract between the buyer and
the seller .... 51
58 A.D.2d 721, 396 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1977) with Dickey v. Lockport Prestress, Inc., 52
A.D.2d 1075, 384 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1976).
47. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
48. See Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 101, 103 (1973).
49. 43 N.Y.2d 583, 374 N.E.2d 97, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1978).
50. See text accompanying and note 47 supra.
51. U.C.C. § 2-318 [alternative B].
52. 43 N.Y.2d at 595, 374 N.E.2d at 403, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (dissenting opinion).
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Justice O'Connell of the Oregon Supreme Court has ar-
gued that acceptance of strict liability in tort terminates the
applicability of the Code.
I can see no reason for recognizing a cause of action as aris-
ing under the Code once this court has taken the step of
designing its own theory of products liability outside the
Code. The practical effect of our holding is that §402A is the
exclusive test of liability.53
Justice O'Connell also argued, in the same opinion, that a
court was not free to adopt section 402A in situations covered
by U.C.C. warranty theory because the Code had preempted
it." He found that the legislature had effectively acted in the
53. Markle v. Mulhollands, Inc., 265 Or. 259, -, 509 P.2d 529, 538 (1973)
(O'Connell, J., specially concurring).
54. The preemption problem was a hot issue in academic circles, but most courts
ignored the challenge or "rebutted" it with conclusory statements. See Titus, Re-
statement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22
STAN. L. REv. 713, 715-18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Titus]; Shanker, supra note 31,
at 7; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Victorson v.
Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 406, 335 N.E.2d 275, 280-81, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39, 46 (1975) (concurring opinion) (citing great weight of authority, fair
reading of legislative purpose and Comment m to § 402A as leading "inexorably" to
nonpreclusion position); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
But see Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218 (Del. Super. 1977) (Delaware
legislature preempted products liability field); Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 378
N.E.2d 61 (Mass. 1978) (strict tort liability was precluded by U.C.C.) (But note that
the Massachusetts legislature has taken a progressive stance and has adopted liberal
provisions, including statutory negation of privity defense). See also the dissenting
opinion of Benjamin, J., in Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 316, 326,
354 N.Y.S.2d 654, 664 (1974), aff'd sub. nom. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
One of the most thorough and balanced treatments of the preemption problem is
Titus, supra note 54. Professor Titus develops a comprehensive and sophisiticated
analysis of the doctrinal foundation for adoption of § 402A despite enactment of the
U.C.C. on a state-by-state basis.
Other useful authorities include: Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's?,
2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 469 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dickerson]; Franklin, supra note
31; Miller, supra note 32; Prosser, The Fall, supra note 8; Rapson, Products Liability
Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and
Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUT. L. REv. 692 (1965); Speidel, Products Liability, Eco-
nomic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Speidel];
Wade, supra note 27.
In Dippel, the Wisconsin court relied in part on Prosser, The Fall, supra note 8,
at 801, to the effect that 1) potential molding of the substantive U.C.C. remedies
would take too much development time, and 2) in somewhat of a contradiction, that
it was really only a change in terminology. 37 Wis. 2d at 456, 155 N.W.2d at 61. Other
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area and had created "an integrated and comprehensive
scheme under which recovery for personal injuries may be
sought by privity and non-privity plaintiffs."55 He contended
that the undesirability of the restrictive Code features "does
not give us license to purge them from the statutes, '51 even
while finding license to nullify the entire Code warranty
scheme.5
Professor Dickerson has traced the evolution of the Wis-
consin position as follows:
The legacy of confusion has come gradually. At first
there was speculation as to whether there were now two
streams of strict tort liability or only one. Gradually the
view that independent streams exist, and that the courts are
free to choose between them, began to take hold.
More disturbing is the general attitude, now settling in,
that somehow we may generally forget the Code so far as the
consumer is concerned. Now becoming typical is the state-
ment in Suvada v. White Motor Company that "[o]ur hold-
ing of strict liability in tort makes it unnecessary to decide
what effect section 2-318 has on an action for implied
warranty."
Today the ascending view is that there is again only one
reasoning by the court included misplaced reliance on Comment 3 to § 2-318 of the
U.C.C. which indicated the section was neutral as to case law development on privity
in U.C.C. warranties, and an argument that sellers' liability could be based on some-
thing different than sales and contract law, citing to § 402A, supra note 25, Comment
m. 37 Wis. 2d at 458, 155 N.W.2d at 623.
Comment m provides that if the term warranty is to be used for the liability im-
posed by § 402A,
it should be recognized and understood that the "warranty" is a very different
kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is
not subject to ... contract rules ....
... The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the
... Uniform Commercial Code ....
§ 402A, supra note 25, Comment m.
These comments are mere conclusions and do not provide the courts with any
analytical rationale to overcome the challenge (and opposite conclusion) that the
adoption of the U.C.C. preempted the strict tort liability theory.
55. 265 Or. at -' 509 P.2d at 536.
56. 265 Or. at -, 509 P.2d at 536-37.
57. 265 Or. at -, 509 P.2d at 536.
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strict liability stream in the consumer area, except that now
it is §402A, and not the Code.58
On the other hand, California, the state that first adopted
the formal theory of strict tort liability in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products,59 recognized that different policies and
sources of law necessarily co-exist in the extremely broad area
of "products liability." Holding in Seely v. White Motor Co.eo
that the U.C.C. governed products cases involving economic
loss,"' the court observed that strict liability "was designed
not to undermine the warranty provisions of the Sales Act or
the Uniform Commercial Code. '62
III. ANALYSis - THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF Austin
A. Scope: Intended v. Practical
The threshold difficulties in evaluating the legal impact of
Austin are the numerous issues the case has raised, and the
wide variety of possible interpretations. A preliminary ques-
tion is whether the case affects express warranty as well as
implied warranty since much of the language in the opinion
refers to warranties in general. 3 At one point, the court re-
ferred to "warranty and implied warranty,"" suggesting that
express warranty was included. In several other instances, the
court utilized broad language, which seemed to subject both
types of warranties to its imperatives. In addition, to the ex-
tent that the context aids in determination of intent, the case
itself involved both express and implied warranty theories,
both of which were dismissed for lack of notice.
On the other hand, the Austin court referred several times
to implied warranty only in the later stages of its discussion.
One of these references included an expression of approval of
the lower court's dismissal of the "implied warranty" count, 5
indicating the court may have assumed that only implied war-
58. Dickerson, supra note 54, at 481, 483 (footnotes omitted).
59. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
60. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
61. Typically defined as damage to or defect in the product itself and lost profits.
See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 683, 685 (1965).
62. 63 Cal. 2d at -, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
63. The common features include privity, disclaimer, and notice.
64. 86 Wis. 2d at 645, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
65. 86 Wis. 2d at 646, 273 N.W.2d at 241.
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ranty had been employed. Thus, a case could be made for the
proposition that the court intended no impact on breach of
express warranty claims. Were this true, Austin's effect prob-
ably would not be narrowed substantially. Implied warranty
has proven more significant than express warranty in products
case recoveries,66 in part because actual promises of specified
quality by sellers are less common than the existence of rea-
sonable expectations of buyers. A case could be made also for
the proposition that the strong "preference" of the court for
strict liability67 and the ambiguous references to warranty in
general may have the actual, pragmatic effect of trial court
dismissals of express warranty and implied warranty cases.6 8
It might be helpful in examining the other questions raised
by Austin to note the ambiguous and inconsistent use
throughout the discussion of old and new procedural terms of
art."9 At one point, the court referred to actions really brought
"in tort" as mislabeled as breach of implied warranty, and
stated that the word "warranty" should be discarded from the
products liability vocabulary. This would suggest that the
Austin change is one of name only, or that warranty is an ob-
solete tort theory.
Other passages which refer to the bringing of a warranty
"action" or warranty "cause of action" when the "recovery,"
"remedy," or "action" is actually "in tort" may be viewed in
66. WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-6 (1980).
67. See text accompanying notes 13-62 supra.
68. Thus effecting what Professor Dickerson, supra note 54, has termed the "sin-
gle stream" theory.
69. Examples include: "where the cause of action is in tort," 86 Wis. 2d at 644,
273 N.W.2d at 240 (emphasis added); "it is inappropriate to bring an action for
breach of warranty where a tort remedy is sought," Id. (emphasis added); warranty
"is encumbered with the ancient baggage of contract actions and should not be em-
ployed where the recovery is one for tort," Id. (emphasis added); "[t]o assert a cause
of action for breach of warranty or implied warranty in a tort action is not fatal to
the pleader's cause, but the interest of justice . . . will be expedited if warranty
claims, as such, are rejected," Id. at 645, 273 N.W.2d at 240 (emphasis added). Fi-
nally the longest statement is:
[W]here an action is brought in tort but denominated as a breach of implied
warranty, the cause of action may be maintained if sufficient facts are alleged
to state a claim for strict liability in tort, but the warranty action as such
should be dismissed. In the event the facts alleged in the warranty action are
insufficient, . . . leave to plead over in strict liability in tort may be granted.
Id. at 645-46, 273 N.W.2d at 241 (emphasis added).
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at least three ways. The language could suggest that the
pleading was intended to allege a tort but is using an outmo-
ded and now unacceptable tort theory. Alternatively, it could
mean that a single, unified substantive nature for the whole
action is to be identified and is to control what theories may
be pleaded - when that nature is tort, no warranty theory
may be maintained. Finally, the language may mean that
when a conventional tort remedy is in fact sought, the breach
of warranty is not appropriate as another claim or theory and
must be stricken. In other words, a party may not plead both
strict liability and breach of warranty but may plead either
alone.
Another question raised by Austin is whether the decision
affects warranty outside of its tort-law context. One might
suggest that Austin merely defined warranty out of tort law as
an obsolete tort theory or as a nomenclature problem. This in
turn would require the conclusion that, in merely striking
down tort-based warranty, Austin had no effect on U.C.C.
provisions or contract law.
This position is not tenable. First, although Schnabl v.
Ford"0 itself referred to the tort character of warranty,7 1 Wis-
consin common law warranties were considered a part of con-
tract law.7 1 Second, Austin employed exceedingly general lan-
guage and seemed to preclude recognition of any substantive
basis for implied warranty theory in products cases. Third,
the statement referring to "breach of warranty or implied
warranty," suggests the court also may have been touching on
express warranties, which are founded in the contract
relationship. 8
More importantly, Austin harkened back for its rationale
to the philosophy and policy of Dippel v. Sciano.7 ' Both the
Dippel court and Dean Prosser"5 recognized that warranty
70. 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195 N.W.2d 602 (1972).
71. Id.
72. Ghiardi, The Last Word in Products Liability - Section 402-A of the Re-
statement of Torts, 6 CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. OF Wis. 79, 110 (1966).
73. Notwithstanding the parallel tort doctrine of misrepresentation of fact. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
74. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
75. Prosser was inconsistent. He realized that the Code had taken over as a foun-
dation for the extension of warranties, yet he advocated the view that warranty
should be treated only as a tort matter, thus permitting the judiciary to simply re-
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theory was grounded on the Uniform Commercial Code. Both
Dippel and Prosser reasoned that the Code draftsmen had
had the opportunity to salvage warranty by modifying its ob-
jectionable features but had failed to do so, requiring the
courts to act. The route taken by Dippel and suggested by
Prosser favored outright replacement of warranty theory
rather than supplementation. Austin renewed the criticism of
those warranty features existing under the U.C.C.
The final blow to reading the case as restricted only to so-
called "tort warranties" is the fact that Austin itself was
brought on both express and implied warranties, and the ex-
press warranty count was successfully challenged by the de-
fendant on U.C.C. notice requirements. The court's approval
of the dismissal order in effect affirmed an order rejecting
U.C.C. claims because of noncompliance with U.C.C. require-
ments.76 Moreover, the subsequent practice under Austin in
actual litigation confirms that the real impact is on U.C.C.-
based warranty claims.7 7 Realistically, in Austin, as in the
typical product case, the dispute over warranties involved
statutory sales warranties. To assert with respect to Austin
the concept of "tort warranty," amounts to a "straw man" ar-
gument deflecting the actual thrust of the case.
Realistically, then, the inquiry must be directed at the
larger task of developing the rule which defines the circum-
stances, if any, in which one may maintain claims or counts
based on Wisconsin Statute sections 402.314-15 after Austin.
The most narrow formulation of the Austin rule would be
that a warranty claim is barred only when a plaintiff actually
pleads strict liability. This interpretation is unlikely because
the court clearly stated the rule is operative even when strict
tort liability is not. pleaded. If the pleading fails to sufficiently
set forth a strict tort claim, it will be dismissed with leave to
replead properly.78
The more likely interpretation would be that a warranty
place it with strict tort liability. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 8, at 801.
76. Describing the basis for the dismissal order as avoiding encumbering the case
with duplication. 86 Wis. 2d at 646, 273 N.W.2d at 241.
77. Allis-Chalmers v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., No. 490-767 (Milwaukee Co. Cir.
Nov. 6, 1979), discussed in text accompanying note 101; Aetna Casualty & Surety v.
Ford Motor Co., No. 483-258 (Milwaukee Co. Cir. July 16, 1979).
78. 86 Wis. 2d at 645-46, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
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claim is barred only if the nature of that action is "in tort."
The court evidently is unwilling to allow the pleadings to de-
termine the "nature" of the action. 9 By negative implication,
the court will look to the underlying facts - to the conduct,
action, events and type of harm alleged. Under this interpre-
tation, the nature of the action will then be determined by
what substantive area of the law appears to fit the facts.
Hence, the Austin court implicitly found that a defective
product, an accident and a personal injury amounted to a
"tort action" seeking a "recovery in tort," notwithstanding the
concomitant breach of a U.C.C. warranty. Once the court de-
termines that the true nature of the action is tort, the plaintiff
will not be permitted to maintain warranty allegations.
This interpretation conforms most closely to the language
of the Austin opinion. It also invokes the type of rigid think-
ing behind the old concepts of "forms of action" and "theory
of the pleading." The approach requires an arbitrary defini-
tion of an entire complaint or action as necessarily "of" a sin-
gle nature and precludes another count which is of a different
nature even though the theory independently fits the facts.
Extremely technical analysis, uncertainty, and inconsis-
tency can result when courts are forced to characterize indi-
vidual actions as being of a particular "nature." A host of
variablbs might attend this process. What if the parties are
commercial entities? What if one party is a business while the
other is an individual consumer? Perhaps a different legal na-
ture would arise if the harm is property damage, or if the only
injury is repair cost. What if personal injury is involved? Will
unequal bargaining power or a shotgun complaint pyschologi-
cally influence the determination? Will a "predominant" char-
acter of the action be sufficient if the choice is not crystal
clear? These considerations will come into play as courts at-
tempt to define an action as "in contract" or "in tort."
Further, in contemporary civil practice, the appropriate
level of analysis for determining the theoretical nature(s) as-
serted by plaintiff is not the whole action or complaint, but
rather each allegation or grouping of allegations which states a
claim under some liability theory.80 Thus, several "natures"
79. See note 78 supra and text accompanying.
80. See Nicolodi v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 370 So. 2d 68, 72 (Fla. App.
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may attach to one complaint and action, and because several
theories from diverse areas of the law may fit the facts, each
may be properly maintainable.
Aside from these analytical burdens, contemporary civil
procedure and pleading rules cast doubt on this construction
of Austin. In Wisconsin, there is only one form of action - a
"civil action."' In this action, one may set forth several state-
ments of a claim, hypothetically or alternatively, regardless of
consistency and whether based on legal or equitable
grounds.2 Thus, a plaintiff may allege multiple theories to
support one claim. In addition, a party may join any and all
claims the party has against the other party, regardless of
their nature, in one action.88 Finally, an initial challenge to
the pleading for redundancy ordinarily should not succeed be-
cause strict tort and warranty are not co-extensive theories.84
To the extent that the Austin holding is a pleading rule in
products cases, it seems contrary to the spirit, if not the letter,
of the civil procedure code.
The most troublesome aspect of the pleading interpreta-
tion of Austin is the suggestion that when the Austin rule is
triggered by the so-called "tort" nature of an action, the tech-
nical legal result is that the warranty count fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. In other words, a war-
ranty count, sufficient on its face, states a legally recognized
liability theory in one complaint but not another.
Normally, if a theory of liability is recognized in a jurisdic-
tion, then a pleading which incorporates the elements of that
theory states a valid claim. Recognition of the theory requires
that when a set of facts positively meets the terms of the the-
ory, the validity of the resulting claim cannot turn on subjec-
tive preferences or extraneous factors that do not negate the
elements of the legal theory, such as a pleader's choice to state
other theories of the same or different substantive body of
1979) (adoption of 402A does not result in demise of warranty; a given set of facts can
support alternative theories in products liability area: in tort for negligence and strict
liability and in contract for breach of implied warranty. In this case, each was a suffi-
ciently alleged cause of action).
81. Wis. STAT. § 801.01 (1977).
82. Wis. STAT. § 802.02(5)(b) (1977), provided they are pleaded in good faith.
83. Wis. STAT. § 803.02(1) (1977).
84. See text accompanying notes 104-10 infra.
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law. There is no room for a "here today, gone tomorrow, back
the next day" approach to recognizing a legal theory if suffi-
ciently pleaded in its own right.
In summary, application of Austin in the relatively narrow
sense of a specific rule of pleading would be a return to the
anachronistic procedural games of the code pleading era. In
products liability cases, procedural rulings would become
more tenuous and substantive rules of law could be subject to
inconsistent application, thereby defeating the rational func-
tionalism of the new Wisconsin rules of civil procedure.
A broader reading of Austin is also possible - that prod-
ucts liability cases are to be grounded only in a tort theory of
strict liability (or negligence). This construction would elimi-
nate warranty theory in products cases as a practical matter.
The advantage of this construction is its simplicity. Instead of
leaving some vestige of a cognizable claim in warranty when
the action could be characterized as "in contract," this inter-
pretation eliminates the uncertainty by abolishing warranty
altogether in the products context.
This more expansive version is supported by the overall
thrust of the court's discussion. 5 The court's analysis seems
to treat the entire products liability field as a matter of tort
law. This view of products liability is evident in the following
language from the Austin opinion: "The legal fiction of war-
ranty which was useful in the transitional stage of the devel-
opment of products liability law should be rejected; and where
the action is one in tort, the only appropriate action is that of
strict liability in tort ... ."81 The fiction of warranty was
seen as a disposable stepping stone in route to the destination
of strict liability in tort. This historical viewpoint of the court
bolsters its current disposition to equate all products cases
with tort theory.87 What emerges from this legal-philosophical
posture is the notion that products liability is exclusively a
tort matter, free of all "encumbering" hybrids" and contrac-
tual characteristics.
The accuracy of this broader view of Austin rests on
85. 86 Wis. 2d at 644-46, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
86. Id. at 645, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
87. The preference for tort law was clearly evident in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d
443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
88. See material cited at note 11 supra.
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whether the larger pattern of the court and the Austin discus-
sion taken as a whole convey more content than the court's
use of conditional phrases such as "where the action is one in
tort."8  This author believes the intent, spirit and ultimate
practical effect of the case is to remove "all products liability
cases from the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code."90
Even if such intent by the court has not yet fully materialized,
the pragmatic effect of the decision likely will be the eviscera-
tion of the U.C.C. warranty provisions from the products
liability field.9 1
B. Scope of Cases Affected
The reach of Austin rests in part on the question of what
constitutes a products liability case within the tort framework
of Wisconsin law. Where strict liability is applicable, Austin is
applicable. Where Austin is applicable, warranty theory is un-
welcome. As it happens, the Wisconsin court has extended
strict liability to an unusual degree,92 beyond Dippel and the
case law of other jurisdictions,93 thus assuring maximum de-
struction of warranty theory.
In City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder, & Associates,
Inc.," plaintiff sought to recover the cost of replacing a defec-
tive product, a roof,95 as well as the repair cost for other prop-
erty damaged because of the product's defects. The defen-
dants included designers, builders and suppliers. On appeal,
the court held that strict liability in tort extends to damage to
the product itself that is coincident to damage to other prop-
erty." More importantly, the court stated in dictum "that a
strict liability claim for pure economic loss involving only the
cost of repair or replacement of the product itself and loss of
89. 86 Wis. 2d at 645, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
90. Note, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 208, 212 (1967-68).
91. And "products liability" has turned into a far reaching area indeed. See text
accompanying notes 94-98 infra.
92. See text accompanying notes 94-97 infra.
93. See note 97 infra.
94. 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
95. Note that the court assumed without analysis that this was properly a sale of
goods transaction.
96. 72 Wis. 2d at 44, 240 N.W.2d at 127, relying on City of Franklin v. Badger
Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973) (the case first applying
this rule - with no analysis).
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profits is likewise not demurrable. ' ' 97 Thus, the court ex-
tended strict liability into prime U.C.C. territory to cover
cases where the defect in fact produces no consequential dam-
age or injury, but remains a mere condition requiring
correction.
Unless Austin is modified,98 it could, if read in conjunction
with La Crosse, result in the elimination of warranty provi-
sions where they work best - exclusively commercial transac-
tions involving only commercial harm that would otherwise be
completely covered by the provisions of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and the freely negotiated contracts thereunder. Of
course, consumers also will gain from the La Crosse extension
of strict liability and be subject to the concomitant Austin re-
striction, even in cases of pure economic loss such as repair
and replacement costs.
One might argue that courts will not apply Austin, a con-
sumer personal injury case, to a situation involving economic
harm in a transaction between two commercial entities per-
fectly suited to the U.C.C.'s provisions and policies. However,
recent lower court decisions have applied Austin strictly and
have therefore dismissed warranty claims,99 even in the purely
commercial setting.100 In one case,"0  a Wisconsin manufac-
97. 72 Wis. 2d at 44, 240 N.W.2d at 127. Property damage, for purposes of prod-
ucts liability, often is defined so as to exclude damage or defect to the product itself
and instead refers only to damage to other property. See Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 49 IMI. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (App. Ct. 1977); Annot., 16
A.L.R.3d 683, 685 (1967).
An important restriction on the scope of strict tort liability held by a majority of
courts, see 1 PROD. LLAB. RFr. (CCH) 4230 (1979), but no longer by Wisconsin, is
the refusal to extend a strict tort recovery to nonconsumer, purely commercial or
economic losses alone. Here the Code continues to play a dominant role. See Frank-
lin, supra note 31, at 981; Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 683, 685, n.2. (1967).
The leading case is Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965), wherein the California court, through Justice Traynor, became more
reflective and less reflexive on the interrelationship between strict tort liability and
the U.C.C. The court defined the scope of strict tort as not extending to mere cost of
repair of defect and lost profits. See also Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co.,
Inc., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil
Products, 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978). The leading case allowing recovery in strict
tort is Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
98. See text accompanying notes 110-18 infra.
99. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., No. 490-767 (Mil-
waukee Co. Cir. Nov. 6, 1979); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ford Motor Co., No.
483-258 (Milwaukee Co. Cir. July 16, 1979).
100. See text accompanying notes 110-18 infra.
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turer brought suit to recover repair or replacement costs and
lost profits due to down time resulting from defective machin-
ery parts supplied by the defendant corporation. The plaintiff
alleged negligence, breaches of U.C.C. warranties, and strict
liability. The court, relying solely on Austin, granted the de-
fendant corporation's motion to dismiss the breach of war-
ranty count for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.
In [Austin], our Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that
following its decision in [Dippel, that it would be inappro-
priate to bring an action for breach of warranty where a tort
remedy is sought .... The supreme court said, "Under the
rationale of Dippel, therefore, where an action is brought in
tort but denominated as breach of implied warranty, the
cause of action may be maintained if sufficient facts are al-
leged to state a claim for strict liability in tort, but the war-
ranty action as such should be dismissed." Accordingly, this
Court determines that the plaintiff's first claim which this
Court views as a breach of warranty should be dismissed
and the motion by the defendant is granted.102
Plaintiff had argued that Austin was not intended to ap-
ply, nor should apply, to sales warranty provisions in purely
commercial transactions. Despite the plaintiff's warning that
such an application of Austin would "emasculate the Uniform
Commercial Code" 103 in the very context for which the Code
was intended, the court refused to reconsider its dismissal. In
effect, it confirmed that Austin means what it said, and has
left no such pockets of survival for U.C.C. warranties.
C. Prevention of Recovery
A hypothetical case illustrates further the potential effect
of La Crosse and Austin on U.C.C. warranties and ultimate
recovery. Assume that Manufacturer contracts with Supplier
for Supplier to sell and ship, in assembled form, a widget
press with which Manufacturer will make widgets. Through
no acts of negligence, the rim of an internally rotating disc has
101. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., No. 490-767 (Milwaukee
Co. Cir. Nov. 6, 1979).
102. Id. at 1-2.
103. Quoted in Memorandum of Philadelphia Gear Corporation in Opposition to
Motion for Reconsideration, at 3.
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been bent during final assembly. Manufacturer accepts, in-
stalls and uses the machine. During three months of opera-
tion, the defective disc places increased stress on its three
anchoring bolts. One breaks, and the disc begins to shimmy
noticeably. The press is shut down and Manufacturer com-
plains to Supplier without satisfaction.
In Manufacturer's lawsuit to recover repair cost and prof-
its lost during one week of down time, Manufacturer pleads
breach of express warranties, breach of implied warranties,
and strict liability in tort. On defendant's motion to dismiss,
most states would dismiss the strict liability claim because
that theory does not extend to the type of damage claimed.
On the other hand, the warranty claims would be sustained,
the case being a classic U.C.C. Article Two matter.
In Wisconsin, however, the reverse could occur. La Crosse
specifically approves recovery under strict tort liability in
these circumstances and this claim would not be dismissed.
Actions for repair costs and lost profits resulting from defec-
tive products are tort remedies in Wisconsin, the recovery is
one for tort, and the claim is properly "in tort." Therefore,
like the Allis-Chalmers court, mentioned earlier, the court
here would dismiss the warranty claims pursuant to Austin.
Had Manufacturer pleaded only in terms of warranty, the
court would have tested the sufficiency of the facts for their
ability to state an action based on strict liability in tort.1 '4 If
the counts had failed to meet the elements of strict liability,
the court would have dismissed the complaint with leave to
plead over.
Extending the hypothetical demonstrates that Austin fur-
ther can alter the liability finding under certain circum-
stances." 5 Assume in the hypothetical that the evidence
would show that the product clearly had failed to conform to
its stated quality or had failed to meet the standards of
merchantability. 0 However, expert witnesses for the litigants
disagree on the potential danger of the bent disc. The jury is
104. What if in fact the condition of the product was not unreasonably danger-
ous? This would rarely have legal effect on the conduct of the action, for it would not
be officially found until late in the process.
105. Assume that the evidence establishes that defendant exercised more than
reasonable care.
106. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
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presented with evidence indicating that at shipment time, the
defect created little or no danger and was minor in nature, a
problem easily detected and rectified. On the other hand,
plaintiff's evidence indicates that the disc could have sheared
all its bolts, flown loose, pierced the outside casing and struck
the operator. The case goes to the jury on the disputed factual
issue.
Recall that this case involved no "accident," no damage to
property, except for the product, and no emotion-invoking
human pain or suffering. The jury finds that the condition of
the product was not unreasonably dangerous and thus fails to
meet an element of strict liability.1 0 7 Plaintiff is out of court.
Although there is evidence sufficient to prove breach of war-
ranties, plaintiff could not proceed on that theory under Aus-
tin. The required dismissal of the warranty counts rendered
certain warranty evidence and arguments irrelevant and in-
admissable. The issues of merchantability and fitness for in-
tended purposes could not be tried or decided. The plaintiff
would lose on liability where he would have won prior to
Austin.
How would the judicial system respond to such a sequence
of events? Because the courts have ruled that products liabil-
ity actions are to be brought only on strict liability and negli-
gence theories, failure to satisfy their requirements means los-
ing the case. This system, the court might reason, is dictated
by the policy advantages of strict tort liability, including its
relative lack of procedural pitfalls and its accommodation of
comparative negligence. The greater good might justify the
unintended harm. Or, perhaps, touched by a concern for jus-
tice in the individual case and recognizing the inadvertent re-
sult, the court instead might act in a remedial fashion. It
could create an exception or proviso to Austin, to the effect
that an official finding of fact that the product was not in an
unreasonably dangerous condition because of a defect, but
was below merchantable quality or other U.C.C. standard,
converts the action from one "in tort" to one "in contract."
Then a court might resurrect the "rejected"' 08 warranty claim
so that it would now state a claim upon which relief could be
107. See note 25 supra.
108. See Austin v. Ford, 86 Wis. 2d at 647, 273 N.W.2d at 240.
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granted. Finally, the case could go all the way to haunt the
supreme court with the unintended ramifications of Austin,
and result in clarification of the Austin rule. Then the court
could decide that Austin is not authority for summary dismis-
sal of warranty counts. 109
This later scenario is more likely to result if the plaintiff
subjected to the Austin rule is a consumer, particularly one
who is personally injured. Vary the hypothetical so that the
press is for home workshop use and the seller is a national
retail chain. Again, because any harm to the consumer in
terms of repair cost is also recoverable in strict tort, warranty
counts probably would be dismissed. If the jury weighs the
same contradictory evidence objectively and finds no unrea-
sonably dangerous condition in the product at sale, the con-
sumer's action will fail.110 This might be a compelling case for
modification of the Austin rule by the supreme court, and the
court could avoid a morass of complicated litigation by acting
at its next opportunity.
IV. Austin: IMPROPER MEANS TO A VALID END
Regardless of the exact breadth one gives Austin, the case
will have, and already has had, the effect of judicially nullify-
ing, to some degree, a statutorily provided theory of liability.
The supreme court has made unavailable, either to individu-
als in certain cases or to all plaintiffs claiming for defects in
products, a recovery scheme specifically adopted by the Wis-
consin Legislature.1
109. See text accompanying notes 110-18 infra.
110. One might expect that whenever personal injury results, a jury would be in-
fluenced by a de facto presumption that the product was unreasonably dangerous -
if it hurt someone, it "must" have been unreasonably dangerous, even if no other
evidence indicates this. Of course, evaluation of the degree of danger must focus on
the actual condition at time of sale. The injury, without more, can no more properly
establish an unreasonably dangerous defective condition than it can establish the de-
fect in the first instance. See W. PRossER, ToRTs, supra note 3, § 103 at 671.
111. Among the problems with the warranty aspects of the Austin case, one pre-
liminary difficulty goes to the court's internal inconsistency through the course of the
litigation. One should recall that the court made new law to justify exercising juris-
diction over the case under the Wisconsin wrongful death statute. It held that the
Wisconsin statute applied to the case because the contractual breach of warranty
claim asserted by plaintiff, based on a sale in Wisconsin, alleged a "wrongful act"
causative of death within the meaning of the statute and thus the case was not de-
feated by the general rule that a tort claim accrues in the state of injury. In view of 1)
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There is no constitutional objection to Wisconsin Statute
sections 402.314-15 upon which to ground this abrogation.
Nor does the court's interest in judicial administration, effi-
ciency, and prevention of wasteful duplicative trials justify
the result Austin will bring. The court should not have formu-
lated a rule which would result in a preemption of a legisla-
tively extended legal claim. It is submitted that the Austin
rule exceeds the court's authority by effectively operating as a
judicial repeal of Wisconsin statutes.
Obviously, valid interests exist which might justify some
form of control over the theories advanced in litigation. These
interests surface collaterally in the following language of Aus-
tin: "It is clear, therefore, that the trial court appropriately
ruled that the plaintiffs could not encumber the case by trying
it on the duplicative theories of strict products liability and
breach of implied warranty.""" 2 This passage is the key to the
court's real concern - a fear of encumbering cases with dupli-
cative theories.
It also clearly indicates that the per se Austin ban on war-
ranty theory is the result of an assumption that strict tort and
implied warranty are always duplicative. However, that as-
sumption is incorrect. Different facts must be proven to estab-
lish liability under the two claims and each potentially could
permit recovery where the other would not.113
the trial court's dismissal of the warranty claims; 2) the supreme court's characteriza-
tion - patently contrary to the pleadings and the substantive law - of the Schnabl
warranty counts as really a misnamed strict liability count, in tort; 3) the fact that
the warranty counts were extraneous to recovery; and, 4) the high court's holding that
in such a context, warranty counts failed to state cognizable claims, one may have
expected illumination from the court on the complete undercutting of Schnabl's justi-
fication for keeping the case alive and the alternative legal basis responsible for the
continued exercise of jurisdiction.
112. 86 Wis. 2d at 646, 273 N.W.2d at 241. The quoted statement stretches the
facts a bit, since the trial court dismissed for lack of required notice. See note 39
supra.
113. Compare § 402A with Wis. STAT. § 402.314. The key difference is the stan-
dard governing defects: § 402A requires an unreasonably dangerous defective condi-
tion. Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110, 240 N.W.2d 154 (1976); Bruce v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976). The leading case contra is
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
"Merchantability" is the most important standard for warranty, and it is defined
in U.C.C. § 2-314(2). The Wisconsin version of U.C.C. 2-314 is Wis. STAT. § 402.314,
set out at note 12 supra. Among products held unmerchantable by courts have been
watery wine, bad-tasting applesauce, and cars with starting problems. See the cases
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The court's other interest is evidenced by its rather obvi-
ous distaste for the "ancient baggage of contract" and "addi-
tional hurdles" of warranty, such as privity, disclaimer and
notice.114 The court clearly is interested in protecting the con-
sumer and permitting his or her just recovery. Strict tort lia-
bility is policy-based and justice-oriented.115 However, the
court's enthusiasm turned in Austin from its previous expan-
sion of strict liability and critical, but hands-off, policy toward
warranty, to a negative approach of actually disposing of an
additional source of consumer remedy. Preference for one lia-
bility theory is fine, but the existence of perceived advantages
is no authority for eclipsing a legislative enactment.11 6
In addition, the cumulative result of recent "progressive"
case law in the products area 117 has paradoxically been a
counterproductive limit on the ability of consumers to re-
cover. Practice after Austin has shown that lower courts are
willing to read the U.C.C. warranty sections right out of the
statutes. 18 This is not a desirable result. The Code reflects
important and practical policy choices which ought not be ig-
nored. In particular, commercial entities with equivalent bar-
gaining power should be able to freely allocate risks as be-
tween themselves, without subsequent imposition of non-
consensual standards based on inapplicable consumer protec-
tion policies. Just as the Dippel-402A rationale of shifting the
loss from the ordinary consumer to the entity more capable of
absorbing it does not extend to the disputes about monetary
losses between business enterprises, neither should the Austin
collected at Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 694 (1978). See also Speidel, supra note 54, at 311.
Mere "unsuitability" will suffice. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572
S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
114. 86 Wis. 2d at 644, 273 N.W.2d at 240. But see note 31 supra. The require-
ments have been increasingly eroded by recent judicial activity.
115. See generally the comments to § 402A.
116. An eclipse by a judicial body is defined by one commentator:
One should distinguish between a jurisprudential eclipse and a legislative
repeal. A repeal of a statute takes place when the legislature by official act
brings it to an end. In an eclipse, the statute remains unrepealed on the books
but is blotted out by what the courts consider a superior body of law covering
the same subject.
Shanker, supra note 31, at 8 n.13.
117. See, e.g., City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder and Associates, Inc., 72
Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
118. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
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rule, especially applied in tandem with the La Crosse case.
The court should supplement the U.C.C. with advanta-
geous alternatives when needed. But concurrent, not exclusive
strict tort liability, is the treatment mandated by Wisconsin
law.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO OVERLAP
One sound compromise to the overlap of the Code and
strict liability is that adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court. In
Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company v. Ford Motor Com-
pany,11 the court refused to let a plaintiff have both implied
warranty and strict liability submitted to the jury in a prod-
ucts case. On the second appeal, 120 however, the court refined
its position on the issue of mutual exclusivity.
We interpret our prior pronouncement to mean simply
that we recognize it as a practical matter, as opposed to a
rule of law, that not many cases will involve both theories
sufficiently to warrant having them presented for the consid-
eration of a jury. We do not interpret it to mean ... that
both theories shall never be given consideration in the same
case.
121
Emphasizing that the particular facts would control, the court
stated that most situations would not require both instruc-
tions because there would be duplication; in that situation,
only strict liability would go to the jury.
This is an improvement over a preclusion of the whole lia-
bility theory, because it protects a plaintiff from being
prejudiced by a flat rule where the facts of the case may yield
a different result. It is submitted that Hawkeye represents the
furthest a court can legitimately go towards nullifying the
remedies provided by a statute.1 22 Control over the trial and
the jury instructions to insure that justice is accomplished
without undue jury confusion defines the outer limits of the
court's authority for restricting the availability of the statu-
tory remedy when it is applicable by its terms.1 23 The court's
119. 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1971).
120. 199 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1972).
121. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
122. See Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 65 IMI. 2d 140, 357 N.E.2d 500 (1976).
123. See Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971). Cases that
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authority to do so terminates when a material prejudice to the
plaintiff would result. An order precluding a U.C.C. warranty
theory should be reversible error if plaintiff is prejudiced by
losing a verdict on other theories when the evidence justifies
maintaining a warranty claim.
Wisconsin employed the same type of analysis in Howes v.
Deere Company,124 in which the minor plaintiff was injured
when his foot came into contact with a riding lawn mower.
The trial court forced the plaintiff to elect between negligence
and strict liability theories. Plaintiff indicated a preference for
strict liability but submitted instructions and a special verdict
formulation on ordinary negligence as well. The trial court
submitted only a strict liability question in the jury verdict.
The jury found no liability. Reversing, the supreme court
stated that it wished to remove any inference that Dippel au-
thorized the trial court's action in forcing an election. The
Howes court held that a case-by-case analysis of the propriety
of submitting either or both theories must be employed.
This is not an either-or situation requiring the plaintiffs to
make the decision. The decision as to whether to submit one
question or two questions, and the order of submission in
the event of two questions is to be made by the trial judge in
each case. The reason it might be appropriate to submit
both questions on occasion is that the liability imposed in a
negligence per se case is not based upon a failure to exercise
ordinary care with its necessary element of foreseeability,
both common elements of an ordinary negligence case
125
Thus, the court recognized that negligence and strict lia-
bility differ in proof elements and could potentially lead to
would permit a refusal to instruct on alternative warranty and strict tort theories
turn on the countervailing factors of jury confusion and prejudice to the plaintiff, this
latter factor is often controlled by whether the definition of defect for strict liability
is identical to that of implied warranty or is more demanding. See Goblirsch v. West-
ern Land Roller Co., 246 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1978) (no prejudice, explicitly be-
cause definitions of "defect" were congruent and jury found no defect at all). See also
Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971) (dis-
cussed in Goblirsch); Fisher v. Gate City Steel Corp., 190 Neb. 699, 211 N.W.2d 914
(1973) (definitions of defect implicitly the same; no prejudice). But see note 113
supra.
124. 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976).
125. Id. at 273, 238 N.W.2d at 79.
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different results. Both negligence and U.C.C. warranty actions
impose burdens that strict liability does not.126 But warranty
provides the important advantages of freeing a plaintiff from
proving the lack of reasonable care required for negligence
and the unreasonably dangerous nature of a defect necessary
for strict liability.127 Therefore, warranty compares favorably
with negligence in the Howes rationale as an alternative the-
ory to strict liability.
If the court recognizes that someone may be materially
prejudiced under a strict reading of Austin and decides that
this situation is not permissible under the statutory law of
Wisconsin, it probably will be able to effect adjustment to
Austin with little pain. The court could clarify that Austin
does not preemptorily bar U.C.C. warranty claims, but instead
is to be construed as recognizing the authority of trial courts
to employ a Howes analysis to prevent unnecessarily confus-
ing a jury.128 It is suggested, on the other hand, that the best
policy in any case where the unreasonable danger element
may be questionable, is that all theories supported by evi-
dence be submitted in order to avoid needless relitigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is great temptation to surrender to the elegant sim-
plicity of resorting to section 402A to solve all liability ques-
tions involving defective products. 129 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has demonstrated a strong commitment to the strict li-
ability theory as a vehicle for yielding the "correct" policy re-
sults. The court also has demonstrated a valid concern for un-
necessary confusion in the litigation process.
But sometimes judges perceive statutes as "alien intrud-
1 26. Currently, Wisconsin warranty requires privity.
127. 2 FRUMER & F=DmAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrry § 16 A[4][g] (1979); Dippel v.
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis.
2d 110, 240 N.W.2d 154 (1976); § 402A, supra note 25, at (1).
128. Factors to consider could include evidence to support each theory, potential
prejudice to plaintiff in denying instruction on a theory which a jury might sustain
exclusively and ability to maintain the theories distinct in the minds of the jurors.
129. The court did refrain at least from expanding the § 402A theory to medical
malpractice. Hoven v. Kelbe, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977). The dynamics
of Hoven include the fact that the significant holding concerned a contested issue,
unlike Dippel, La Crosse or Austin.
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ers" to be obeyed only grudgingly,130 or to be treated as no
higher than case law."3 l By resting on policy preference and
assumptions that sweep a bit too broadly, the court, in Austin
v. Ford, chose improper means of accomplishing its valid
ends. Austin has the effect of improperly preempting a liabil-
ity theory provided by statute which could result in actual de-
nial of recovery where it would otherwise obtain. The court
should modify the Austin rule to make it clear that the re-
striction on products liability theories is only proper to avoid
unnecessary duplication. The court should recognize that, be-
cause warranty and strict liability are not coextensive and
that the necessity of concurrent theory pleading often would
not be known until the factfinder completes its task, interfer-
ence with maintaining concurrent theories should be mini-
mized. The court should be guided in this problem area by the
policies of judicial restraint and separation of powers.
STEVEN P. MORSTAD
PATENTS - Patentable Subject Matter - Living
Man-made Organisms Held to Be Patentable Subject
Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980). Article I, section 8
of the United States Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their... Discoveries." Pursuant to this grant of power, un-
known at common law, Congress has authorized patent pro-
tection for the invention or discovery of "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof."1 In the much pub-
130. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-15
(1936).
131. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213
(1934).
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). The first federal patent statute enacted in the United
States, the Patent Act of 1790, specified the classes of patentable subject matter as
"any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein." Patent Act of 17 90, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 111 (repealed 1793). In enacting the Patent
Act of 1793, Congress changed the classes of patentable subject matter to "any new
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